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February 23, 2018

Ms. Barbara Childs Wallace
Chair, Board of Directors
Office of Compliance
John Adams Building
110 2nd Street Southeast, Room LA 200
Washington, DC 20540

Dear Ms. Wallace:

I am writing to insist that you take immediate action to address the serious cybersecurity and oversight lapses in the Office of Compliance (OOC), which pose a significant threat to our national security and threaten to expose deeply sensitive information about the victims of sexual harassment.

The OOC was established by the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 and charged with protecting employee rights. Pursuant to those responsibilities, the OOC collects and stores all Congressional sexual harassment complaint information. However, during a December 2017 briefing requested by my staff, the OOC revealed that it stores that information on a server owned and operated by a third-party contractor in a private data center. This arrangement places sensitive data about the victims of sexual harassment beyond the protection of congressional cybersecurity personnel.

My staff also learned that the OOC has failed to take even the most basic steps to protect the deeply sensitive information entrusted to it by legislative branch employees who have experienced sexual harassment and other workplace abuses. The OOC revealed that its server has never undergone a cybersecurity audit, and that it has not implemented rudimentary defensive network-security best practices. Moreover, the OOC has never hired anyone to focus on cybersecurity, nor does the OOC currently employ a full-time system administrator. The OOC's astonishingly lax security measures provide the means for hostile actors to access, modify, delete, or disseminate embarrassing and compromising information about legislative branch staff who have reported incidents of sexual harassment to the OOC. OOC's failure to take these basic steps leaves current and former congressional employees needlessly vulnerable to the possibility of having aspects of their lives exposed that they may or may not choose to disclose on their own.

Compounding my grave concerns, the OOC's inexplicable choice to conceal its use of a private, third-party hosted server prevented proper oversight and management: Though the Library of Congress (LOC) is nominally responsible for the OOC's Information Technology, the LOC's Chief Information Security Officer first learned of the server during the same December briefing as my staff. This obfuscation prevented the LOC from using its cybersecurity resources and

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
expertise to secure and protect the troves of sensitive congressional employee data housed by the OOC. Similarly, Senate leadership first learned of this arrangement on the same day as my staff.

We all have a responsibility to listen to the stories of survivors of sexual harassment and assault and do more to prevent these abuses. The many brave individuals who have come forward to share their experiences have moved our national dialogue forward, particularly in recent months. I am cognizant that Congress shares many of the flaws of our society, and is far from perfect: Nevertheless, many of my colleagues in Congress are leading the conversation, and together we are pushing for change. As we work to strengthen the protections available to survivors, it is our duty to not re-victimize them by breaking our promise of confidentiality. If these individual survivors wish to go public with their experiences, that should be their choice, and not the result of lax government cybersecurity.

It is therefore inconceivable that the OOC would watch as other federal government institutions were systematically targeted by foreign intelligence agencies and decide that it did not need to take even the most rudimentary steps to protect itself and the sensitive data which has been entrusted to it. I am deeply concerned about the woefully inadequate state of the OOC's cybersecurity practices. I am also stunned at the lack of urgency OOC's leadership displayed after learning of this problem. Although my staff first raised these issues with OOC leadership over two months ago, the OOC's reticence in taking even the most basic steps to secure its server suggests that its leadership does not understand or appreciate the severity of this issue. That is beyond unacceptable.

To that end, I insist that you immediately reform the OOC's approach to cybersecurity to better protect victims and their private data. Please respond to me by March 2, 2018 with the steps the OOC has taken to remedy the concerns described in this letter and a timeline for how you will address any outstanding issues.

Sincerely,



Ron Wyden
United States Senator

CC: The Honorable Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader
The Honorable Charles E. Schumer, Senate Minority Leader
The Honorable Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader

Ms. Barbara L. Camens, Board Member, Office of Compliance
Mr. Alan V. Friedman, Board Member, Office of Compliance
Ms. Roberta L. Holzwarth, Board Member, Office of Compliance
Ms. Susan S. Robfogel, Board Member, Office of Compliance

Mr. Linus Barloon, Chief Information Security Officer, U.S. Senate
Mr. Randy Vickers, Chief Information Security Officer, U.S. House of Representatives
Mr. Sean Lang, Chief Information Security Officer, Library of Congress